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Balancing US Interests in India and
Pakistan
Rudra Chaudhuri
On 6 November 2010, during his maiden visit to the sub-continent, President
Barack Obama delivered what came to be seen in both India and Pakistan as a
disappointing speech.1 Opposition leaders in India claimed that the president did
not go far enough to reprimand Pakistan to dismantle terrorist hubs ensconced
within its borders. Indeed, he did not once mention Pakistan. This was considered
unacceptable. He was, after all, giving the speech in Mumbai, a city that had been
witness to devastating attacks in November 2008.2 The attackers all hailed from
Pakistan. In Pakistan, the entire US administration was berated for warming up to
India, and this, when Pakistan serves as a frontline state in the war against terror.3
Further, the fact that the president’s following address to the Indian Parliament did
not mention Kashmir did little to inspire confidence amongst an elite who have
long advocated third-party intervention to resolve this age old conflict.4
In many ways, the reactions to Obama’s visit to India exemplify the difficult task
of balancing US interests and relations with South Asia’s two nuclear giants. In the
current milieu, this undertaking has taken on an all important dimension – Indian
and Pakistani rivalry in Afghanistan. A key aim of US foreign policy has been to
convince Pakistan to focus on anti-Coalition insurgent groups along the Durand
line rather than the Indian army to its east. This is essential if the US and its allies
are to achieve some degree of progress in ‘degrading’ the Afghan Taliban along the
Afghanistan–Pakistan border. As is widely believed, campaign progress against
insurgents on one side of the border is at least partially dependent upon progress
on the other.5
Given the implicit significance of the role played by India, either in its bilateral
relations with Pakistan or because of its expanding presence in Afghanistan, the
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1 ‘‘Obama Speech at the Taj Hotel: Full Text’’, Hindustan Times, 6 November 2010.
2 ‘‘Why Obama Made No Mention of Pakistan on Terror Issue’’, Economic Times, 6 November 2010.
3 ‘‘Obama Backs India’s Drive for UN Power’’, The News, 9 November 2010.
4 For a short account, see Chari et al., Four Crises and a Peace Process, 13–38.
5 Pakistan Policy Working Group, The Next Chapter, 1.
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key question for US foreign policy in South Asia remains: what can be done to
reconcile India–Pakistan relations? This question is especially potent since it under-
lies Pakistani calculations vis-a`-vis its approach to the war in Afghanistan.6
As importantly, an answer is required to instill confidence in a relationship
marred by deep-seated mutual suspicion. This is the primary question this article
sets out to explore, in four parts. First, it briefly traces attempts made by successive
US administrations during the Cold War to balance its relations with India and
Pakistan.7 Second, the article outlines the initiatives – and the tensions therein –
adopted by the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations in the past two decades.
Third, it provides an account of India–Pakistan relations since the terrorist attacks
in Mumbai. The conclusion sets out current efforts to encourage dialogue, and
what more can be done to assist this process.
The Cold War
For much of the Cold War, US foreign policy imperatives in South Asia were
designed to balance Washington’s relations with both India and Pakistan. This
of course proved difficult, and at times, even impossible. Whether by design or
otherwise, the Truman administration’s position during the First Kashmir War
(1947–49) irked the Indian leadership.8 Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first
prime minister, felt let down when Washington failed to recognise Pakistan
as the aggressor and decided, instead, to treat both the newborn states as victims
of aggression.9
By the early 1950s, the US’ attention firmly moved to Pakistan. In May 1954,
the US entered into a mutual defence pact with Pakistan. For Nehru, the Cold War
had been brought to South Asia.10 From this point on, at least till the end of the
Cold War, successive Indian governments remained suspicious and anxious of US
national security policy in South Asia. Conversely, following the 1954 alliance with
Pakistan – ‘America’s most allied ally in Asia’11 – US attempts to reconcile differ-
ences with India led to growing unease in Islamabad. To assuage Pakistani anxieties,
in the early 1960s, the Kennedy administration pressed both India and Pakistan
to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Yet, six rounds of talks later, the American’s realised
the futility of trying to mediate between the contending parties.12 Indian
6 Rashid, ‘‘Pakistan on the Brink’’.
7 The article does not provide a profound historical narrative. For further reading, see: McMahon, Cold
War on the Periphery; Schaeffar, Limits of Influence; Kux, India and the United States and The United States
and Pakistan.
8 For a detailed discussion, see: Raghavan, War and Peace, chap. 4; Schoefield, Kashmir in Conflict, 49–126.
9 Raghavan, War and Peace, 122.
10 ‘‘US Aid to Pakistan is Intervention’’, Times of India, 2 March 1954.
11 Ayub Khan, Chief of the Pakistani Army Staff, made this statement when the pact was signed.
McMahon, ‘‘United States Cold War Strategy’’, 812.
12 Ibid, 862–5.
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representatives refused to accept third-party arbitration and flatly turned down
US and UK-led efforts to mediate in the dispute. Conversely, the Pakistani delega-
tion, led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, consistently pressed for outside intervention to
‘internationalise’ the dispute.
Barring the short-lived interest in Pakistan, and more specifically, President
Yahya Khan, in the early 1970s – when President Richard Nixon and Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger were said to ‘tilt’ in favour of Pakistan – US followed
a semi-detached approach to South Asia. Whilst the Indian nuclear tests in 1974
occupied the attention of the Ford White House, the question of balancing Indian
and Pakistani interests remained fairly mute for much of the 1970s.
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a key US objective was to elicit the
support of the Pakistani government – led by President Zia-ul-Haq13– to host,
train and support the various mujahidin and Taliban factions in their jihad against
Soviet troops and the puppet regime in Kabul.14 Much like in the 1960s, a key
question for the US was what more could be done to convince the Pakistani
military to shift its attention from the Indian border ‘‘facing a nonexistent threat
of Indian aggression’’ to ‘‘a much more plausible one coming from Soviet-occupied
Afghanistan?’’ Unsurprisingly, the answer lay in ‘‘reorienting India’s policy in
regard to Pakistan’’.15 That India refused to heed Western pressure was hardly
surprising.
Post-Cold War
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Pakistan’s carrot and stick policy vis-a`-vis
US policy and Kashmir lost its raison d’eˆtre. In the meantime, military-to-military
contacts between India and the US began to increase for the first time in fifty
years.16 In 1998, when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic
Alliance (NDA) came to power, India’s changing approach to the US and the US’
altered perspective with regard to India – viewing India outside of the India–
Pakistan tinder box – gained momentum. Indeed, despite the fact that India
tested five nuclear devices in May 1998, followed by Pakistan, thereby escalating
tensions in the sub-continent, the BJP’s engagement-based approach to foreign
affairs gained traction in Washington.
Between May and July of 1999, India and Pakistan fought a limited war in the
Kargil district of Kashmir. While the details of this conflict are not pertinent to this
13 De Riencourt, ‘‘India and Pakistan’’, 433.
14 For a first-hand account of how these factions operated alongside Pakistani support, see Strick van
Linschoten and Kuehn, My Life with the Taliban, 21–47. It is a widespread misperception that the
Taliban emerged at the beginning of the 1990s. As this book makes clear, Taliban factions operated
alongside the mujahidin during the Soviet jihad.
15 Riencourt, "India and Pakistan’’, 434.
16 Talbott, Engaging India, 1.
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article, the US administration’s reactions to the conflict certainly are.17 Having
accepted that the Pakistani army, led by General Pervez Musharraf, then the Chief
of Army Staff, used covert means to infiltrate Indian territory, for the first time
in history an American president unequivocally took India’s side in an India–
Pakistan conflict. When pressed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to apply pressure
on India to resolve the crisis, Clinton and his inner coterie made it clear that the
Pakistani military, and not the Indian army, were the aggressors. Hence, the respon-
sibility to end the impasse lay squarely with Pakistan. It would have to withdraw its
troops behind the so-called Line of Control (LoC) that divides Azad Kashmir from
the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Following Sharif’s return from Washington, this
is exactly what Pakistan did.18 According to Stephen Cohen, ‘‘Indians were flab-
bergasted that we [US] supported them’’.19
The conflict finally ended on 26 July 1999. Less than a year later, President
Clinton visited India, injecting fresh energy into India–US ties. Prime Minister
Atal Bihari Vajpayee claimed that the visit ‘‘marks[ed] the beginning of a new
voyage in the new century by two countries which have all the potential to
become natural allies’’.20 The seemingly objective position adopted by the
Clinton White House in the Kargil dispute went some way in ‘normalising’ rela-
tions with India. However, the following presidency of George W. Bush would take
the relationship to a whole new level.
De-hyphenation and the Bush years
Unlike previous administrations, the Bush team decided on a path defined by what
came to be called the ‘dehyphenation strategy’. Rather than supporting one party
or the other, the Bush administration sought to follow a policy centered on
‘‘a decoupling of India and Pakistan in US calculations’’.21 The policy of
de-hyphenation was to be followed even though America’s efforts in the war
in Afghanistan were dependent upon Pakistani support and cooperation. Bush’s
South Asia team worked hard to engage New Delhi and Islamabad individually,
refusing to revert to the Kashmir dispute or India–Pakistan tensions to elicit
Pakistani support. Conversely, whilst the Kashmir dispute was placed on the
back burner, the US made clear to India that it would have to play a much smaller
role in Afghanistan. Interestingly though, side-lining the Indian presence in
Afghanistan – at least in the initial phase of the war – was balanced by an incen-
tive-based scheme at the strategic level. That is, whilst the US worked closely with
17 For details, see Malik, Kargil: From Surprise to Victory; also: Musharaff, In the Line of Fire.
18 See Chari et al., Four Crises, 119–48.
19 Author’s interview with Stephen Cohen, 11 September 2008, Washington DC.
20 Talbott, Engaging India, 203.
21 Tellis, ‘‘The Merits of Dehyphenation’’, 22.
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the Pakistani leadership with regard to Afghanistan, at the same time, Bush sought
to engage India in a dialogue of strategic importance: finding a way to resume
nuclear related trade – suspended since India tested a nuclear device in 1974 – and
increase military to military contacts. However, convincing India to diminish its
role in Afghanistan would not be easy.
Following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the Indian government
‘‘communicated to the American mission in New Delhi it would extend whatever
support the United States wanted, including military bases, in its global war against
terrorism’’.22 Many within the Indian foreign policy establishment believed
that the US’ declaration of ‘war on terror’ created strategic opportunities for
New Delhi. Accordingly, the logic went, the US would now be forced to pay
attention to the terrorist networks within and around Pakistan. This of course
was a matter of priority for India, a country that faced the wrath of terrorist attacks
in Jammu and Kashmir.23
Further, the Taliban, supported by the Pakistani military and the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) harboured Osama Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda leadership.24
India, on the other hand, supported the Northern Alliance whose leader, Ahmed
Shah Masood, was the deputy president and defence minister of the UN-recognised
Islamic Government of Afghanistan.25 Following Masood’s assassination on 9
September 2001, his forces – the Northern Alliance cadres now led by General
Mohammed Fahim – served as the cavalry in the war that was soon to ensue. This
was all good news for India, which thought it had thrown its lot with the right
faction in the coming war.
However, whilst those in India were happy to point fingers at Pakistan, the fact
remained that for the US, and for any number of reasons, Pakistan was and continues
to be the more important strategic actor with regard to military operations in
Afghanistan. Not least because Pakistan, and not India, shares a 2250 kilometer
border with southern and eastern Afghanistan. The key to eliciting Pakistani support
apart, of course, from the billions of dollars the Bush administration would have to
sanction to the Musharraf regime26 – most of which remained invisible to the
ordinary Pakistani – was making sure that India was kept out of the fray.27 In the
end, Indian overtures to support US-led operations were turned down.
Conversely, and in tandem with the de-hyphenation policy, between 2001 and
2008, US relations with India improved considerably. As noted by C. Raja Mohan,
22 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, xi.
23 Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad.
24 Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, chap 14.
25 ‘‘Masood Sees no Military Solution’’, Interview with Ahmad Shah Masood on 13 August 2001, The
Hindu, 12 September 2001.
26 Between 2002 and 2008, the Bush administration provided Mushraff with little over USD 11 billion.
For details, see Pakistan Policy Working Group, The Next Chapter, 28–9.
27 Rubin, ‘‘Saving Afghanistan’’, 69.
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the Bush administration ‘‘reconceived the framework of US engagement with
New Delhi’’.28 Making sure not to isolate India whilst increasing the amount
of support to Pakistan, ‘‘Washington and New Delhi quietly began a sustained
two-year conversation that would ultimately result in a breakthrough diplomatic
achievement’’: the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) in 2004.29 The
NSSP created the framework for close-quarter interaction focusing on civilian
nuclear energy, civilian space programs, high-technology trade and missile defence.
In September 2008, the US Congress authorised President Bush to sign into law
a bill that permitted the US government to enter into nuclear related trade with
India.30 Suffice it to say that by the end of 2008, US–India relations had been
transformed.31 In the case of Pakistan, the war on terror brought with it economic
dividends unavailable since the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.32 Bush agreed
to the sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan after successive US administrations
had ‘frozen’ the deal for well over a decade.33 In 2004, Pakistan was labeled
a major-non NATO ally.
From the outset, the Bush administration appeared to have done the unthink-
able: simultaneously improving relations with India and Pakistan. Kashmir no
longer served as the lynchpin for Pakistani cooperation. India was freed from the
bug-bear of the non-proliferation regime that had served as a thirty odd-year
stumbling block. Yet, on a closer look, the policy of de-hyphenation was very
successful as far as India is concerned, but less so when it comes to Pakistan.
The entire de-hyphenation construct appeared feasible because no one in the
Bush administration focused efforts on the war in Afghanistan. It made strategic
sense to develop an instrumental relationship with a regime that sought – at least
in rhetoric – to target Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan. However, the deeper-seated
problem of the sheer policy failure in Afghanistan appeared to matter little to an
Iraq-obsessed administration.
Rather than a crafty or innovative approach to South Asia, the de-hyphenation
policy seems to have been sustainable because in a sense, the Bush administration
de-hyphenated itself from the war in Afghanistan. According to Barnett Rubin, the
Bush administration ‘‘tolerated the quiet reconstitution of the Taliban in Pakistan
as long as Islamabad granted basing rights to US troops’’ and ‘‘pursued the hunt for
Al Qaeda’’.34 Thus, minimum strategic goals led to minimum strategic demands.
By way of deduction, when strategic expectations remain minimal – as they
clearly were for the Bush administration in regard to Afghanistan and Pakistan
28 Mohan, ‘‘India and the Balance of Power’’, 27.
29 Tellis, ‘‘The Merits of Dehyphenation’’, 30.
30 For a comprehensive review of the ‘N’ Deal, see Chari, Indo-US Nuclear Deal.
31 Kapur and Ganguly, ‘‘Transformation of US-India Relations’’.
32 Kronstadt, ‘‘Pakistan-US Relations’’, 92–3.
33 Tellis, ‘‘The Merits of Dehyphenation’’, 31–2.
34 Rubin, ‘‘Saving Afghanistan’’, 70.
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post 2002 – the boundaries delimiting failure and success appear all the more
blurry. To be sure, if the Bush administration had made Afghanistan a priority,
thereby increasing expectations with regard to Pakistan’s role and cooperation in
the war in Afghanistan – as was the case when President Obama came to power –
the trade-off would no doubt have demanded a return to the line of argument used
in the 1960s or 1980s: cooperation, at least various degrees of cooperation
would depend upon improved relations with India. History attests to this.
Indeed, this was appreciated by those behind President Obama’s first sixty-day
review that produced the AfPak strategy of March 2009.
Obama and the AfPak approach
On 22 January 2009, only two days after Barack Obama was sworn in, late Richard
Holbrooke was officially named Special Representative to Afghanistan and
Pakistan. He was apparently supposed to have been named the Special
Representative to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Between November 2008 and
January 2009, the transition period for the new US administration, however,
the Indian government lobbied hard to make sure that India was kept outside of
Holbrooke’s expected brief.35 For the US administration, it was essential to apply
diplomatic pressure on India to improve relations with Pakistan, even convince
India to enter into a dialogue on Kashmir. This was the only way to assuage
Pakistani anxieties, allowing its military to train its guns against anti-Coalition
insurgents along its western borders. Hence, and notwithstanding Indian resis-
tance, as Holbrooke put it, ‘‘I will deal with India by pretending not to deal
with India.’’36 The key was to turn up the diplomatic heat on New Delhi.
The logic, at least for this US administration, seemed fairly simple. If India
began a series of discussions on Kashmir, Pakistan would feel more confident
about relocating the bulk of its troop formations from the border with India
to that with Afghanistan.37 This, no doubt, was one of Pakistan’s demands.38
Hence, the Kashmir dispute was placed squarely in the middle of what might be
called the ‘AfPak-India’ strategy.
This approach appears to have been driven by a calculation based on a somewhat
obscure and even ungrounded reading of Indian strategic behaviour: that the good-
will generated in India as a result of the passage of the nuclear deal with the
US increased Washington’s leverage with New Delhi. As Bruce Riedel remarked,
35 ‘‘India’s Stealth Lobbying Against Holbrooke Brief’’, The Cable - Foreign Policy.com, 24 January 2009.
36 Woodward, Obama’s War, 86.
37 Quoted in C.R. Mohan, ‘‘Barack Obama’s Kashmir Thesis’’, Indian Express, 3 November 2008. Also see
Obama, ‘‘Renewing American Leadership’’.
38 For a comprehensive review, see Cohen, S. P., C.C. Fair, S. Ganguly, S. Gregory, A. Shah and A. J. Tellis,
‘‘What’s the Problem with Pakistan?’’ Foreign Affairs roundtable, 31 March 2009, http://www.
foreignaffairs.com/discussions/roundtables/whats-the-problem-with-pakistan
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‘‘the opportunity for diplomacy is riper than usual in this new era (2008
onwards)’’.39 Similarly dubious was the calculation that the US would be able to
leverage this goodwill at a time when India’s elite pressed the government of the
day – the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance – to bring senior members of
the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), who had masterminded and executed the terrorist
attacks in Mumbai, to book. How could India be expected to engage Islamabad
when the top LeT leadership was found to be freely ensconced on Pakistani soil?
With regard to the assertion that the ‘N’ deal increased Washington’s leverage
over India, Obama’s South Asia specialists might have paid more attention to
India’s historic record when it comes to the Kashmir dispute. Contrary to the
view that the nuclear deal had made India diplomatically vulnerable, the Indian
government made it abundantly clear that it will not dance to the Obama tune.
As Ashley Tellis warned the US Congress well before the N-deal gained sway, even
if US–India relations were ‘‘successfully consummated . . . India will likely march to
the beat of its own drummer’’.40 This indeed seems to be the case. Since the first
Kashmir War, India has maintained that Kashmir is a bilateral issue between
New Delhi and Islamabad. This was agreed to in principle by both sides in
1972. To be sure, unlike Pakistan, which maintains a territorial claim over
Jammu and Kashmir, Indian elites are content with internationalising the existing
LoC. US pressure on this issue is expected to push New Delhi into creating a
common administrative space in Kashmir, a plan often written about by
Washington insiders.41
Mumbai and after
From the outset, India may agree to such a solution. However, the government
of the day can agree to do so only when the terrorist infrastructure within Pakistan
is dismantled. At the present time, the anti-rapprochement sentiment in India
following the Mumbai attacks is a genuine stumbling block to improving India–
Pakistan relations.
Both governments have worked towards breaking the impasse, but with little
success. Since 2009, the prime ministers, foreign ministers and foreign secretaries
have met on four occasions. In the summer of 2009, at Sharm-el-Sheikh, the
Egyptian resort town, the two prime ministers even crafted a joint statement.
Seen as a major breakthrough in the strategic thaw, the statement read that terrorist
acts should be uncoupled from the dialogue process.42 This was, however, recanted
39 Riedel, ‘‘South Asia’s Nuclear Decade’’, 125.
40 A. Tellis, ‘‘The United States and South Asia’’, Testimony to the House Committee on International
Relations, US House of Representatives, 14 June 2005, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/
index.cfm?fa=view&id=17070&prog=zgp&proj=zsa
41 Riedel, ‘‘South Asia’s Nuclear Decade’’.
42 G. Parthasarthy, ‘‘Sell out at Sharma-el-Sheikh’’, Business Line, 23 July 2009.
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as a result of domestic opposition in New Delhi. It was read by political leaders
and critics alike as making major concessions whilst gaining nothing in return,
especially since LeT suspects were yet to be convicted.
Pakistan argues that, much like in any other state, convictions depend on evi-
dence, which its courts have not yet found. Notably, Hafiz Saeed, who India alleges
masterminded the Mumbai operation, was placed under house arrest following the
attacks, but ultimately freed.43 On his part, Saeed made a plea to the Indian
government to ‘free Kashmir’ or ‘face jihad’.44 Statements like this continue to
enrage Indian elites. The strategic chill was re-enforced on the floor of the UN
General Assembly (GA) in September 2010. Former Pakistani Foreign Minister
Shah Mahmud Qureshi once again brought up the issue of Kashmir; while Indian
Foreign Minister S. M. Krishna made clear that the atmosphere precluded meeting
his counterpart on the sidelines of the GA.
In February 2011, the respective foreign secretaries met again in the Bhutanese
capital, Thimpu. This was yet another attempt at paving the way for a ‘bigger
meeting’ between the foreign ministers or even the respective prime ministers.45
While principals from both sides appear to be ‘cautiously optimistic’, few believe
that a formal dialogue process can re-start in any meaningful manner until some,
even nominal, action is taken by the Pakistani government against the LeT. Indeed,
that dialogue is dependent on Pakistani actions was made clear by PM Singh who,
standing next to President Obama, told reporters that dialogue could resume when
the ‘terror machine’ in Pakistan is stopped.46
Inside Kashmir
Beyond the politics underlying AfPak, the burst of discontent on the streets of
Jammu and Kashmir further complicates the prospects of dialogue. Processes
of dialogue on Kashmir – between India and Pakistan – and within Kashmir –
between New Delhi and the people of Kashmir – do not necessarily compliment
one another. This is not to say that the two lines of discourse do not overlap, they
certainly do, but politically, India’s willingness to negotiate Kashmir with Pakistan
is unlikely to materialise unless the current gridlock inside Kashmir comes to an
end. What then explains this gridlock?
In the summer of 2010, local Kashmiris took to the streets protesting
against Indian police brutality, poor infrastructure, growing unemployment, cor-
ruption and, most of all, the lack of political dialogue with New Delhi. While
43 ‘‘Govt. Fails in Bid’’, The Dawn, 26 May 2010.
44 ‘‘Free Kashmir or Face Jihad: Jud’’, Indian Express, 6 February 2010.
45 Quote of Indian Foreign Minister S. M. Krishna, ‘‘Resumption of Talks with Pakistan’’, Times of India,
11 February 2011.
46 ‘‘Highlights of PM-Obama Joint Press Meet’’, Hindustan Times, 8 November 2010.
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New Delhi has begun a process of reconciliation by creating and authorising
interlocutors to gain a sense of the ‘street’, the tenuous and volatile situation
acts as yet another spoiler for Indian-Pakistani talks. The Indian government
would find it easier to enter into discussions once the situation within its own
borders has been tempered.
Further, unlike the early 1960s, when the US and UK missions in India and
Pakistan were somewhat familiar with the intricacies of the Kashmir dispute,
at present, the intellectual investment in finding a solution to the Kashmir dispute
is wanting at best.47 For instance, specialists ague that a common administrative
zone could serve as a first step towards a solution, but the important question
is how would this happen? Having an ‘end state’ in mind is unhelpful when
the question of means remains largely unexplored. This is not to say that the US
administration needs to craft detailed policies for all conflicts. However, it would
be prudent to do so in an issue of recurring importance.
From Kashmir to Afghanistan
By August 2009, the Obama administration realised that the rhetoric on the
Kashmir dispute had proved counter-productive. While American principals con-
tinued to encourage dialogue, Kashmir no longer appeared to serve as a central
piece in the AfPak puzzle. The American administration now seems to have given
up on the idea that traction on Kashmir can encourage Pakistan to focus more of
its resources against the Afghan Taliban and affiliated groups like the so-called
Haqqani Network.
To be sure, Pakistani attention has steadily moved towards India’s increasing
footprint in Afghanistan. In many ways, Afghanistan has ‘‘replaced Kashmir as the
main arena of the still-unresolved struggle between Pakistan and India’’48 and this
has become the rallying cry for not only Pakistani officials and commentators,49
but also Western commentators and officials.50 Yet, and unlike in 2001, Indian
involvement in Afghanistan promises to grow rather than diminish.
As Ahmed Rashid points out, the Pakistani army’s strategic interests are driven
primarily by two concerns: First, ‘‘to ensure that a balance of terror and power is
maintained with respect to India’’, hence, maintaining at least a tenuous link with
jihadi groups who can be deployed when the time comes. Second, the rationale
underlying direct or indirect support to groups like the Afghan Taliban or the
Quetta Shura (QST) is to ‘hedge’ against a US withdrawal from Afghanistan
47 This assessment is based on extensive interviews held by the author with South Asia specialists within
and outside the present and previous US administrations.
48 Rubin and Rashid, ‘‘From Great Game to Grand Bargain’’, 1.
49 Rashid, ‘‘Pakistan on the Brink’’, and ‘‘Trotsky in Baluchistan’’.
50 For a brief outline of this argument, see S. Raghavan and R. Chaudhuri, ‘‘Steering our own Path’’,
Indian Express, 7 October 2009.
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and against ‘‘Indian influence in Kabul’’.51 This line of argument appears to have
strengthened, given what many in Pakistan see as India’s growing influence with
Tajik elites, who were once at the core of the Northern Alliance and remain
vehemently anti-Pakistani. Further, unlike the 1990s, when India was forced to
close its embassy and missions in Afghanistan, currently, the Indian government
has made Afghanistan a priority.
Today, India is the fifth largest international donor in Afghanistan and the
third largest importer of Afghan goods. It has developed deep contacts with
Afghanistan’s many line ministries, supporting large infrastructural and capacity-
building projects.52 Such efforts are seen as a direct affront to Pakistan’s sense
of propriety in a country it has historically treated – although unsuccessfully –
as a client state.
Since the beginning of 2010, both India and Pakistan have sought to prepare for
what might be called the ‘end game’, the scenario when US-led NATO troops
begin – even in small measure – their exit from Afghanistan. The London
Conference in January 2010 made clear that transition from ISAF to the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) was a key objective for almost all NATO coun-
tries. This was confirmed in the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010. The
expected security vacuum in a post-NATO Afghanistan, or at least in most of rural
Afghanistan, is likely to be filled by proxies belonging to one regional actor or the
other. Indeed, with this in mind, Pakistani military elites led by General Ashfaq
Kayani, the Chief of Army Staff, have reached out to both the US and the Afghan
government. The idea is for Islamabad to serve as an interlocutor in a peace deal
between the older members of the Afghan Taliban movement, led by Mullah
Omar, and the Karzai administration. A central aim for Pakistan’s military tsars
is to make sure that the future political make-up in Afghanistan does not allow
India to expand its security or even development footprint.
That this hypothesis is already in motion was most evident in the summer of
2010. Amrullah Saleh, head of the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS),
and Hanif Atmar, minister of the interior, were both sacked by Hamid Karzai.
They were openly hostile to both Pakistan and Pakistani objectives in securing
a peace deal with the Afghan Taliban. Importantly, Saleh was and continues to
be considered a key ally of India, which no doubt supports leading Tajik’s like the
former NDS chief in the hope of maintaining the internal balance of power
in Afghanistan. Further, and unlike the 1990s, India has chosen also to engage
Pashtun elites in the south and east of the country.53 In short, the early etchings of
proxy rivalry between India and Pakistan appear to be underway. Little doubt then,
51 Rashid, ‘‘Pakistan on the Brink’’.
52 For details, see Aikins, ‘‘India in Afghanistan’’.
53 S. Gupta, ‘‘India Shifts Afghan Policy’’, Indian Express, 29 March 2010.
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that Afghanistan increasingly represents the key battleground in conflicting Indian
and Pakistani interests in the region.54
India has two main concerns with regard to the future of Afghanistan, each
of which counters Pakistani objectives. First, to make sure that the Afghan
Taliban do not occupy a dominant political position in the future make-up of
the Afghan body-politic. Increasingly, there is a realisation that the so-called Quetta
Shura will return to parts of the south and the east, but the objective is to disallow
this group to completely usurp power. Interestingly, this is the very faction that
promises to serve Pakistani interests. This is not to say that the Afghan Taliban can
serve as mere proxies of the ISI, but that the latter does hold some amount of
leverage with the QST, steering its actions once in power. Second, Indian security
elites are afraid that the south and east of Afghanistan may serve to host training
camps of the LeT in its war against the Indian state. The LeT was after all estab-
lished in Afghanistan in the early 1990s. Given that the LeT enjoys some amount
of official support from the rank and file of the Pakistani security services, its
activities in Afghanistan, indeed, its very existence, is a constant threat to India,
as is evident from the Mumbai attacks.55
A proxy war in Afghanistan?
These opposing objectives make the case for a proxy war all the more likely,
threatening not only the security situation within Afghanistan, but further exas-
perating the already tense relationship between Delhi and Islamabad. Yet, it is not
too late to stem the proxy tide. The Obama administration, especially the State
Department, has understood the dire consequences of this enmity-laden dynamic.
Yet, the key question is what more can be done to balance Indian and Pakistani
interests in Afghanistan. US officials appreciate that the option of closing Indian
consulates – a Pakistani demand – or pressuring New Delhi to cut back its devel-
opment aid programme is unlikely to work. Correspondingly, dealing with
Pakistani anxieties vis-a`-vis India’s so-called encroachment close to the tenuous
Durand Line, the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, is an all important
objective. As already discussed, the tactic of easing relations by encouraging a
Kashmir dialogue has failed. This, however, does not mean that a proxy conflict
is all but inevitable.
While the competing interests outlined above do little by way of encouragement,
what is increasingly clear is that neither country would want to invest in a large-
scale proxy campaign. Discussions during back-channel and track two dialogues
54 Rubin and Rashid, ‘‘From Great Game to Great Bargain’’.
55 Aikins, ‘‘India in Afghanistan’’.
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since 2009 suggest that both countries could work towards an agreement on
neutrality – between each other’s interests – in Afghanistan. Indian officials
admit that Pakistan is the more important diplomatic actor in the Afghan end-
game. On the other hand, there appears to be a change in approach – at least a
debate – within the military and intelligence services in Pakistan about the utility of
supporting groups like the LeT. Creating ‘red’ and ‘green’ lines in Afghanistan will
take skilful diplomacy, but it is not outside the realm of possibilities. Track two
meetings between senior Indian and Pakistani elites suggest that modest measures
such as greater attention to trade, joint inspections of Indian development projects
in Afghanistan and greater transparency in Indian and Pakistani support to the
ANSF may help bridge the trust deficit.
As far as US interests go, more might be done to change the focus from Kashmir,
which although muted for the time being continues to exercise the US’ South Asia
policy, to regional cooperation in Afghanistan. This will require a change in mind-
set amongst dyed in the wool American bureaucrats, diplomats and, equally impor-
tantly, Washington insiders. Yet, it has every potential to increase the level of
contact and buttress transparency between Indian and Pakistani principals who
have, so far, seldom held meaningful discussions on their respective roles
in Afghanistan.
Conclusion
This article argues that in the current milieu, the task of balancing US interests in
South Asia must necessarily involve encouraging dialogue between New Delhi and
Pakistan with regard to the conflict raging in Afghanistan. The erstwhile strait
jacket approach of looking for a peace deal on Kashmir to balance US interests
in South Asia has failed. The early etchings of the ‘AfPak-India’ approach, which
somewhat clumsily looked towards a dialogue on Kashmir as a confidence multi-
plier for the Pakistani military was hijacked by the Mumbai attacks and later
denounced by Indian elites.
Quiet diplomacy on the part of the US, rather than loud and ham-handed policy
imperatives with little real meaning, has a greater chance of bringing Indian and
Pakistani principals to the negotiating table. Further, and in tandem, US interests
in focusing Pakistani attention on the Afghan Taliban could be aided by investing
greater political capital in a regional dialogue on the future of Afghanistan.
No amount of economic incentives is likely to convince the Pakistanis that a
proxy war in Afghanistan is unlikely. However, and as Pakistani officials concede,
greater transparency between Indian and Pakistani interests in Afghanistan could at
least stem the possibility of a civil war supported by respective regional actors.
Balancing US interests between India and Pakistan requires fresh thinking and new
incentives. A regional peace dialogue supported by the US in Afghanistan has every
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opportunity to build confidence, which may even help bridge the trust deficit with
regard to Kashmir. The opportunity exists now, before India and Pakistan cement
the idea that proxies are in fact the best bet for securing their respective national
objectives.
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